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[Congress shall have the power] To promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.
-United States Constitution'
Every contract ... in restraint of trade or commerce ... is
hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall monopo-
lize, or attempt to monopolize ... any part of the trade or
commerce among the several states ... shall be deemed guilty of
a misdemeanor
-Sherman Act
2
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States intellectual property ("IP") system is the founda-
tion for incentives for authors and inventors to create and invent so that
their work will be distributed to the public for the betterment of society.3
These incentives, in the form of limited monopolies over creations via
patents, copyrights, and trademarks, are becoming increasingly impor-
tant as the United States depends upon intellectual property to sustain its
economy. As the intellectual property industry grows, it becomes vital
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. Sherman Act, ch. 649, §§ I & 2, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (1890) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2 (2000)).
3. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
4. The FBI has stated that:
As the world moves from the industrial age to the information age, the United
States economy is increasingly dependent on the production and distribution of
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to preserve the impetus behind its creation: the public good, or more
specifically, the public's ability to make use of and enjoy new ideas and
creations.!
Antitrust laws, namely the Sherman Act,6 which seek to suppress
monopoly abuse and promote competition, seemingly contradict the lim-
ited monopoly granted to IP owners "Traditionally, courts have
resolved this tension in the only way possible that preserves the essence
of both statutory regimes, particularly the integrity of the federal patent
and copyright statutes: Exercise of the exclusive rights granted to an in-
ventor or author, without more, is not unlawful under antitrust law.' 8 In
order to trigger a violation of antitrust laws, an owner of intellectual
property must attempt to expand the monopoly granted to the owner be-
yond the scope of rights he may legally claim in the intellectual property,
creative, technical, and intellectual products. These valuable products, collectively
known as "Intellectual Property" (IP), are the primary fuel of the U.S. economic
engine. Currently, the U.S. leads the world in the creation and export of IP and IP-
related products. The International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition recently reported
that the combined U.S. copyright industries and derivative businesses account for
more than $433 billion, or 5.68%, of the U.S. Gross National Product, which is
more than any other single manufacturing sector. The Bureau of Labor Statistics re-
ports that between 1977 and 1996 the growth in the IP segment of the economy was
nearly twice that of the U.S. economy as a whole. It is also estimated that the soft-
ware industry alone will employ more than one million people in the U.S. by the
year 2005.
Federal Bureau of Investigation Website, About the Financial Institution Fraud Unit, at
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/fc/fifu/about/about-ipc.htm (last visited April 2, 2004).
5. One commentator has stated:
The copyright/patent clause is notable in that it explicitly mentions the purpose be-
hind the grant of power, an unusual occurrence in the Constitution .... The
economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and in-
ventors in 'Science and Useful Arts.'" Thus both patent law and copyright law
derive their underlying authority from the common public policy of benefiting soci-
ety by granting incentives for the production of novel ideas and creative expression.
James A.D. White, Misuse or Fair Use: That is the Software Copyright Question, 12 BERKE-
LEY TECH L.J. 251, 254-56 (1997) (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1953)); see also
Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) ("The principal objective
of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but 'to promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts.' ").
6. Pub. L. No. 105-22, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of Title 15 of the United States Code).
7. See Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Protection of Operating Software, Copyright
Misuse, and Antitrust, 9 CORNELL J.L. & Pua. POL'Y 161, 161 (1999) ("In the abstract, intel-
lectual property and antitrust coexist in a state of superficial tension. The latter abhors
monopolies, or at least the abuse of monopoly power, while the former actually creates mo-
nopolies through force of law.").
8. Id.
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or "enter into agreements with others regarding the intellectual property
rights (including others holding intellectual property rights in different
products) that restrain trade."9
This Article addresses the judicially created defense to copyright in-
fringement actions that limits these expansion attempts known as
copyright misuse. This doctrine has become necessary in order to pre-
serve the balance between intellectual property and effective
competition. This necessity is reflected in the doctrine's recent judicial
recognition and the failure of antitrust law and other pro-competition
doctrines to remedy the problems presented by new technologies. Part II
of this Article is a brief review of general copyright law and its relation-
ship with antitrust law. Part III will chart the development of the
copyright misuse doctrine up to the twenty-first century, summing up the
prevalent ideology of the doctrine, and Part IV will explore the recent
developments affecting the doctrine and analyze the courts' treatment of
the doctrine. Finally, Part V will consider the arguments for and against
adoption of the doctrine by the courts. It will evaluate the doctrine's
strengths and weaknesses in comparison to other proposed vehicles for
furtherance of a pro-competition model.
II. COPYRIGHT LAW AND ITS PLACE IN A
PRO-COMPETITION MODEL
In the United States, IP protection in the form of patents and copy-
rights is almost entirely a creature of statute.' These statutes provide the
sole source of federal IP protection for authors and inventors."
A patent conveys the right to exclude others from making, using,
selling, offering for sale, and importing the patented invention. 2 How-
ever, as a threshold matter, a patent is only granted to inventions that are
"worthy" of legal protection. The federal statute requires that the inven-
tion have the appropriate statutory subject matter, be novel, be useful,
and be non-obvious. 3 The right to an exclusive monopoly over a pat-
ented invention lasts for twenty years."
A copyright grants its owner the right to reproduce, distribute to the
public, perform publicly, display publicly, and prepare derivative works
9. Id. at 161-62.
10. The statutory rights granted to owners of intellectual property are contained in
Chapters 17 and 35 of the United States Code.
11. See White, supra note 5, at 257-60.
12. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
13. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2000).
14. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 173 (2000).
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of the copyrighted work." Copyright protection is available for original
works of authorship that are fixed in any "tangible medium of expres-
sion" and lasts for the life of the author, plus seventy years. 6 However,
most importantly for the purposes of this Article, the scope of copyright
is limited only to original expression.7 "In no case does copyright pro-
tection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated or
embodied in such work."'8
It is absolutely crucial to limit the rights of the intellectual property
owners to the minimum necessary to "spur the creation and dissemina-
tion of inventions and works of authorship," because the Constitution
only authorizes such grants of rights to the extent that they "promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts."' 9 Although it has been argued
that patents pose a much greater monopolistic threat than do copyrights,
the extension of copyright protection to software and technology has
greatly increased the monopolistic opportunities inherent in the granting
of a copyright.0 One commentator has opined:
For other forms of copyrighted works such as books or paint-
ings, perceiving the expression is the goal of the work .... On
the other hand, software's inherent value lies in its ability to per-
form a function or task when its instructions are executed on a
machine.... Copyright protection for software can be used to
withhold access to the ideas underlying the expression, and can
also prevent others from building compatible products thereby
leveraging existing technology.... To the extent that software
copyright is used to enhance and maintain this type of 'monop-
oly', it can confer significant market power and make software
15. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
16. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 302 (2000).
17. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
18. Id.; see Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); see also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland
Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996)
(holding that the Lotus menu command hierarchy is an uncopyrightable subject matter); Mor-
rissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 (1976)
(stating that § 102(b) is "intended, among other things, to make clear that the expression
adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer program, and that the
actual processes or methods embodied in the program are not within the scope of the copy-
right law").
19. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; White, supra note 5, at 256.
20. See White, supra note 5, at 282; see also Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat
Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1987) (Judge Posner stating that "[t]he danger of monop-
oly is more acutely posed by patents than by copyrights...").
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copyright protection more akin to that provided by patent law
(which protects functional ideas).2
Traditionally, in an attempt to deal with these abuses, the doctrines
such as fair use, preemption and antitrust law were utilized . However,
due to the rapid pace at which software develops, the barriers and bur-
dens associated with brining an antitrust suit, and the inability for
Congress to adapt quickly enough to offer effective statutory solutions,
courts are beginning to look to the copyright misuse doctrine for a more
adaptable and plausible solution to the problem of copyright abuse.
III. THE HISTORY OF THE COPYRIGHT MISUSE DOCTRINE
In general, an intellectual property misuse defense "is a common law
defense to infringement that derives from the equitable doctrine of 'un-
clean hands.' ,,23 The doctrine of misuse has been judicially established
by piecemeal.24 The misuse doctrine was "created to address situations in
which the owner of an intellectual property right used his or her legal
monopoly to create such an asymmetry in the balance of rights that the
courts refused to enforce the normal intellectual property rights."25 Al-
though the misuse doctrine is rooted in the notions of equity, it has been
applied very differently in the areas of patents, copyrights, trademarks
and trade secrets. 26 "Patent misuse is a technical defense to infringement
that relies largely on antitrust analysis for resolution. Trademark [and
trade secret] misuse, on the other hand, remains an inchoate collection of
principles largely based in equity, and is not a recognized defense in
most jurisdictions. 27
Copyright misuse was explicitly recognized as a legitimate doctrine
in 1990 in the Fourth Circuit case Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds,28
but the defense does not owe its origins to Lasercomb. Instead, the
21. White, supra note 5, at 282-84.
22. For further discussion on these topics, see infra Part V(e).
23. Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common Law Doctrine of Copy-
right Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865,
867 (2000). The equitable doctrine of "unclean hands," which lies within the judges discre-
tion, denies relief to the claimant based upon the claimants own wrongdoing. See Atari Games
Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F2d 832, 846 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("In the absence of any
statutory entitlement to a copyright misuse defense, the defense is solely an equitable doctrine.
Any party seeking equitable relief must come to the court with 'clean hands.'" (citations omit-
ted)).
24. Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 23, at 867.
25. White, supra note 5, at 265-66.
26. Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 23, at 880-81.
27. Id. at 88 1.
28. 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
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development of the copyright doctrine can be traced further back in the
Supreme Court's treatment of the patent misuse doctrine.
A. The Foundation of the Copyright Misuse Doctrine as
Developed by U.S. Supreme Court Case Law
"The doctrine of intellectual property misuse first arose in the early
1900's in conjunction with the use of patents."29 In Motion Picture Pat-
ents v. Universal Film Manufacturing. Co.,3° the Supreme Court refused
to enforce a licensing agreement that would only grant a license to use a
patented movie projector if the licensee also purchased the film to be
used in the projector from the licensor.' The Court held that this restric-
tion was invalid because the film that the licensee was required to
purchase was not part of the movie patent, and that the agreement was an
illegal attempt to "continue the patent monopoly in this particular char-
acter of film after it has expired," and "to enforce it would be to create a
monopoly in the manufacture and use of moving picture films, wholly
outside the patent .... ,32 In effect, the Court would not allow the patent
owner to "extend the scope of the film projector patent into the unpat-
ented area of film.
33
A parallel may be drawn between the current state of the copyright
misuse doctrine and the patent misuse doctrine as it existed at this point.
Both doctrines lack uniform acceptance among the federal courts, and
the application of the defense was somewhat uncertain in light of the fact
it relied largely on the conscience of equity.34 The first case to begin lay-
ing the foundation for copyright misuse was Morton Salt Co. v. G.S.
Suppiger In Morton Salt, the Supreme Court expanded and firmly es-
tablished the patent misuse doctrine and referred to the application of the
misuse doctrine in a copyright context in dicta.36 In fact, the Court refer-
enced two circumstances "for application of the like doctrine in the case
of copyright,"'" which would seem to indicate the Court's recognition of
a misuse doctrine that is not restricted to patents.
29. White, supra note 5, at 266.
30. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 519.
33. White, supra note 5, at 266.
34. See Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 23, at 882-83; White, supra note 5, at 265-
69.
35. 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
36. Id.; see Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 23, at 882-83; White, supra note 5, at
256-68.
37. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 494 (citing Stone & McCarrick, Inc. v. Dugan Piano Co.,
220 F. 837, 841, 843 (5th Cir. 1915); Edward Thompson Co. v. American Law Book Co., 122
F. 922, 926 (2nd Cir. 1903)). Both Stone & McCarrick and Edward Thompson Co. deal with
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Morton licensed its patented salt-depositing machine with a condi-
tion that the licensees exclusively use Morton's salt tablets." The Court
found that using the patent to restrain competition in a market for unpat-
ented goods (i.e., the salt tablets) was patent misuse. 39 The Court stressed
the purpose behind the creation of the intellectual property laws, and the
balance that must be achieved between the monopoly granted and the
benefits to society over the patented invention.4 As such, the Court de-
termined that using the monopoly granted by the government to secure
an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted to the patent owner is
violative of this balance, counter to the purpose of the intellectual prop-
erty system, and thus prohibited. 4' The Court declared that courts of
equity "may rightfully withhold assistance from such use of the patent
by declining to entertain a suit for infringement, and should do so at least
until it is made to appear that the improper practice has been abandoned
and that the consequences of the [patent misuse] have been dissipated. 42
It is important to note that the Court in Morton Salt based the patent
misuse defense in equity, and did not draw a strong parallel to statutory
antitrust law.43 "[A]lthough patent misuse in tying cases was later modi-
fied by legislation to resemble an antitrust-based defense, the original
basis in equity may also apply to copyright misuse today."" Additionally,
a "finding of [patent] misuse by the court does not invalidate the patent;
it simply renders the patent unenforceable until the misuse is terminated.
Thus, a finding of misuse precludes the patentee from obtaining relief
for infringement. 45 However, once the patent owner can demonstrate
that the actions causing the misuse have been expunged, courts will
again be willing to enforce the patent, paving the way for another in-
fringement suit.
46In United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., the Court further
extended the misuse defense to situations involving copyright
infringement and antitrust implications. In Paramount, a case involving
the equitable remedy of unclean hands in a copyright infringement context, and were
referenced by the Court as a precursor to the misuse doctrine's application to copyright.
38. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 491.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 492.
41. Id. at 493; see Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 23, at 883.
42. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 493.
43. See Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 23, at 883 (citing Morton Salt).
44. Id.
45. David Scher, Note, The Viability of the Copyright Misuse Defense, 20 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 89,95 (1992-1993).
46. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
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"block-booking" of copyrighted material, 7 the Court utilized the same
reasoning employed in Morton Salt and focused on the importance of an
equitable balance between the rights associated with the grant of a
copyright and the social benefits to be derived from them. 8 In relying on
this reasoning, the Court held the currently scrutinized form of block-
booking was an improper attempt to enlarge the scope of individual
copyrights beyond that which was granted to the owners.49 Although this
case primarily focused on antitrust law and did not directly employ or
adopt the misuse defense in the context of copyright infringement
actions, the Court's reliance on Morton Salt suggests that misuse may be
used outside of patent law to curtail the negative effects of the rights
granted to an intellectual property owner."
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS5' is an antitrust case evaluating the le-
gality of blanket licenses utilized by ASCAP and BMI.12 "Although
copyright misuse is not expressly considered in its opinion, the Court's
antitrust analysis illuminates a set of guiding principles to be applied
when an asserted misuse defense is based upon anticompetitive behav-
ior."53 Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that blanket licenses do not
"facially appear[] to ... always or almost always tend to restrict compe-
tition and decrease output" and as such are not per se violations of the
Sherman Act.54
47. Block-booking is "a particular tying arrangement where the sale or license of one or
more copyrighted works is conditioned on the sale or license of other copyrighted works."
Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 23, at 884.
48. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 158.
49. Id.
50. However, compare United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962), where the
Court considered whether block-booking violated the Sherman Act. Some commentators have
noted that "the Loew's opinion is often cited as support for copyright misuse claims. While
Loew's clearly supports the extension of antitrust-related presumptions to the copyright misuse
context, it does not appear to support extension of misuse principals from patent to copyright."
Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 23, at 884-85. Thus, although Loew's possibly advanced
an antitrust based theory of misuse of copyright, it did little to advance the Morton Salt patent
misuse "public policy" and "balance" principals.
51. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
52. ASCAP (the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers) and BMI
(Broadcast Music, Inc.) both receive nonexclusive licenses from their members to license
nondramatic performances of [their members] works, and [they] issue licenses and
distributes royalties to copyright owners in accordance with a schedule reflecting
the nature and amount of the use of their music and other factors... Both organiza-
tions operate primarily through blanket licenses, which give the licensees the right
to perform any and all of the compositions owned by the members or affiliates as
often as the licensees desire for a stated term.
Broadcasting Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 5.
53. Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 23, at 886.
54. Broadcasting Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 19-20.
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Although the copyright misuse defense was raised in this case, when
the Court reversed the Second Circuit's finding of an antitrust violation,
the Supreme Court stated that a copyright misuse ruling would not be
addressed because it was dependent on the finding of an antitrust viola-
tion.5" However, the dissent written by Justice Stevens advanced the
theory that the misuse principles established by Morton Salt should be
extended to apply to copyrights as well.56 In it, he states that "[a] copy-
right, like a patent, is a statutory grant of monopoly privileges. The rules
which prohibit a patentee from enlarging his statutory monopoly by con-
ditioning a license on the purchase of unpatented goods, or by refusing
to grant a license under one patent unless the licensee also takes a li-
cense under another, are equally applicable to copyrights."57
To date, the Supreme Court has yet to expressly adopt the copyright
misuse doctrine as a legitimate defense. However, the Court has ac-
knowledged the doctrine's existence and its foundation in equity.58 Thus,
development of the doctrine has been relegated to the lower circuit and
district courts, which are left with the dilemma of if and how to apply a
doctrine with little guidance from statute or judicial polestars.
B. The Circuits Begin to Adopt the Misuse Defense
1. The Lasercomb Decision
The first circuit court to firmly establish the copyright misuse doc-
trine as a legitimate defense to copyright infringement cases was the
Fourth Circuit in Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds.5 9 The plaintiff,
Lasercomb, developed and licensed software that aided in the design and
manufacture of steel rule dies used to score paper for folding into car-
tons.6° Lasercomb licensed four copies of this software to the defendant,
who then proceeded to circumvent the protective devices and make three
unauthorized additional copies.6 ' As such, there was no dispute that the
defendant's actions amounted to copyright infringement.62
However, in addition to limiting copying of licensed software,
Lasercomb also included a provision in its standard form contract that
prevented a licensee from independently developing a competing soft-
55. Id. at 24.
56. Id. at 28 n.12 (citing United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131
(1948); United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962)) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 28.
58. See Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 23, at 887.
59. 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
60. Id. at 971.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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ware program for 100 years.63 Based on this license, the defendants
claimed that Lasercomb was "barred from recovery for infringement by
its concomitant culpability" in the abuse of their copyright.
64
The court began its analysis by stating that "[a] successful defense of
misuse of copyright bars a culpable plaintiff from prevailing on an action
for infringement of the misused copyright., 6' The court was careful to
note that "[a]lthough defendants were not party to the restrictions of
which they complain, they proved at trial that at least one Internet licen-
see had entered into the standard agreement, including the
anticompetitive language." 66 Drawing its reasoning from the patent mis-
use doctrine, the court held that "the defense of copyright misuse is
available even if the defendants themselves have not been injured by the
misuse.
' 61
In reaching its conclusion that "a misuse of copyright defense is in-
herent in the law of copyright just as a misuse of patent defense is
inherent in patent law," the court cited to numerous parallels in underly-
ing public policies between copyright law and patent law which justify
the "application of the misuse defense to copyright as well as patent
law. ' After an exhaustive analysis of the historical origin and public
policy behind the creation of intellectual property law and the develop-
ment of the patent misuse doctrine, the court eventually held that "the
rationale of Morton Salt in establishing the misuse defense applies to
copyrights.,
69
63. Id. at 972-73.
64. Id. The disputed portion of the license agreement stated:
D. Licensee agrees during the term of this Agreement that it will not permit or suf-
fer its directors, officers and employees, directly or indirectly, to write, develop,
produce or sell computer assisted die making software.
E. Licensee agrees during the term of this Agreement and for one (1) year after the
termination of this Agreement, that it will not write, develop, produce or sell or as-
sist others in the writing, developing, producing or selling computer assisted die
making software, directly or indirectly without Lasercomb's prior written consent.
Any such activity undertaken without Lasercomb's written consent shall nullify any
warranties or agreements of Lasercomb set forth herein.
Id. at 973.
65. Id. at 972.
66. Id. at 973.
67. id. at 979.
68. Id. at 974 ("The origins of patent and copyright law in England, the treatment of
these two aspects of intellectual property by the framers of our Constitution, and the later
statutory and judicial development of patent and copyright law in this country persuade us that
parallel public policies underlie the protection of both types of intellectual property rights.").
69. Id. at 977. The court reiterated the principle brought out in Morton Salt, stating that
"the granted monopoly power [that accompanies a grant of intellectual property] does not
extent to property not covered by the patent or copyright." Id. at 976.
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The court expounded upon this rationale by adapting the traditional
language of Morton Salt to the context of copyright:
The grant to the [author] of the special privilege of a [copyright]
carries out a public policy adopted by the Constitution and laws
of the United States, "to promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to [Authors] ... the
exclusive Right. . ." to their [original works.] But the public pol-
icy which includes [original works] within the granted
monopoly excludes from it all that is not embraced in the [origi-
nal expression]. It equally forbids the use of the [copyright] to
secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the
[Copyright] Office and which it is contrary to public policy of
the grant.7°
Therefore, the court in Lasercomb explicitly adopted a "scope of the
grant" copyright misuse analysis (i.e. the "public policy" analysis). In
other words, owners of a copyright were forbidden from using their grant
of a monopoly to gain a monopoly in a subject matter outside of the
rights in which he was granted. If they were found guilty of this conduct,
then a court would refuse to enforce the owner's copyright against the
alleged infringer.
The court additionally held that, as with the patent misuse defense
under Morton Salt, it is not necessary to prove an antitrust violation in
order to successfully assert copyright misuse.71 "So while it is true that
the attempted use of a copyright to violate antitrust law probably would
give rise to a misuse of copyright defense, the converse is not necessarily
true-a misuse need not be a violation of antitrust law in order to com-
prise an equitable defense to an infringement action.""
Ultimately, the court found the copyright misuse defense valid in
this case, stating that Lasercomb's licensing agreement "goes much fur-
ther and essentially attempts to suppress any attempt by the licensee to
independently implement the idea which [the software] expresses."73 It is
important to note that the court focused on the unreasonableness of the
70. Id. (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
71. See id. at 978 (quoting Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488, 494 (1942)
("It is unnecessary to decide whether respondent has violated the Clayton Act, for we con-
clude that in any event the maintenance of the present suit to restrain petitioner's manufacture
or sale of the alleged infringing machines is contrary to public policy and that the district court
rightly dismissed the complaint for want of equity.")).
72. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978.
73. Id. Recall that "[a] copyright, of course, protects only the expression of an idea (the
[software] code), and not the idea itself (using [the] software to make steel rule dies.)" Id. at
978 n.19.
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licensing agreement," and essentially ignored "the actual effects on
competition or market power of the plaintiff, as it would in an antitrust
analysis."7
2. The Practice Management Decision
The Ninth Circuit was the next circuit to fully adopt the copyright
misuse doctrine in Practice Management Information Corp. v. American
Medical Ass 'n.76 Following the rationale of the Fourth Circuit's decision
in Lasercomb almost in its entirety, the Practice Management court
adopted the "public policy" (non-antitrust) analysis of the copyright
misuse doctrine, and reaffirmed that "a defendant in a copyright in-
fringement suit need not prove an antitrust violation to prevail on a
copyright misuse defense."77
As in Lasercomb, licensing provisions in restriction of competition
were the foundation for the misuse holding.78 Specifically, the American
Medical Association ("AMA") granted the Health Care Financing Ad-
ministration ("HCFA") a nonexclusive, royalty free and irrevocable
license to use, copy, publish and distribute a coding system for medical
procedures ("CPT") on the condition that the HCFA exclusively use the
CPT and require its use in programs administered by the HCFA.79 As
such, "the plain language of the AMA's licensing agreement requires the
HCFA to use the AMA's copyrighted coding system and prohibits HCFA
from using any other."8" This ultimately led the court to conclude that the
AMA misused its copyright.8 ' According to the court, "[t]he controlling
fact is that HCFA is prohibited from using any other coding system by
virtue of the binding commitment it made to the AMA to use the AMA's
copyrighted material exclusively .... Conditioning the license on
HCFA's promise not to use competitors' products constituted a misuse of
the copyright by the AMA. 82
74. Id. at 979 ("The misuse arises from Lasercomb's attempt to use its copyright in a
particular expression . . . to control competition in an area outside the copyright, i.e. the idea
of computer assisted die manufacture, regardless of whether such conduct amounts to an anti-
trust violation.").
75. Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 23, at 890.
76. 121 F.3d 516 (1995).
77. Id. at 521.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 517.
80. Id. at 520-21.
81. Id. at 521.
82. Id.
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3. The Alcatel Decision
In a very complex and significant decision, the Fifth Circuit formally
adopted the copyright misuse doctrine in Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Tech-
nologies, Inc.83 Although the court found copyright misuse due to a
licensing agreement exceeding the "scope of the grant," the Fifth Circuit
"looked more carefully at the context and the effects of the plaintiff's
anticompetitive behavior."84
Alcatel (formerly known as DSC Communications Corporation,
("DSC")), a company that developed switching equipment for use in
routing telephone calls, created and received a copyright on software that
controls this equipment. Alcatel's licensing agreement for this software
included, inter alia, a restriction on the software limiting its use to the
operation of Alcatel switches, a prohibition on copying the software or
disclosing it to other parties, and an authorization to use the software
"only in conjunction with [Alcatel] manufactured equipment. 8 6 A con-
flict arose when DGI Technologies was formed to produce "cards" that
would be added to the switching equipment. 87 Because the cards made by
DGI must be compatible with Alcatel's switching system, DGI was
forced to download and copy Alcatel's operating system software for
testing and development.8 Alcatel brought suit against DGI for in-
fringement and DGI asserted the copyright misuse defense. 9
In contrast to Lasercomb and Practice Management, which dealt
with attempts to suppress competition with a copyrighted product,
Alcatel's misuse stems from its attempt to use its "copyrights to
indirectly gain commercial control over products [Alcatel] does not have
copyrighted [or patented]." 9 The court held that "DGI was effectively
prevented from developing its product, thereby securing for [Alcatel] a
limited monopoly over its uncopyrighted [and unpatented]
microprocessor cards."9' Alcatel's actions in preventing "card"
manufacturer competitors from developing products that were
compatible with Alcatel's copyrighted software is an illustrative example
83. 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999).
84. Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 23, at 892.
85. See Alcatel, 166 3d at 777.
86. Id.
87. Alcatel's customers would frequently need to expand the call-handling ability of
their switches. "One way to expand the call-handling capacity of [Alcatel] switches is to add
groups of 'cards' to the switch." Id. at 777-78.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 792.
90. Id. at 793 ("[T]he public policy which includes original works within the granted
monopoly excludes from it all that is not embraced in the original expression."); see Frisch-
mann & Moylan, supra note 23, at 893.
91. Alcatel, 166 F.3d at 794.
Gaining Momentum
of a copyright owner exceeding the scope of the grant (the copyrightable
expression contained in the software) to gain a monopoly in an
unpatented and uncopyrightable item (the microprocessor "cards"),
which is, inter alia, a misuse of copyright.
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS SURROUNDING
THE COPYRIGHT MISUSE DOCTRINE
Until 2003, the remaining federal circuits had yet to officially adopt
the copyright misuse doctrine.92 However, recently it seems as though the
copyright misuse doctrine is gaining momentum, as it was recently
adopted by the Third Circuit and acknowledged in at least nine other
district or circuit court cases. The doctrine's elevated profile can be at-
tributed to society's increased dependence on licensing agreements,
particularly in the field of technology, as a large portion of the cases deal
with allegedly faulty agreements that restrain competition.
A. Video Pipeline-The Third Circuit Adopts the
Copyright Misuse Doctrine
Although the Third Circuit ultimately held that the copyright misuse
doctrine was not applicable to the copyright owners, the court in Video
Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc. officially recog-
nized copyright misuse as a legitimate defense and adopted the public
policy (as opposed to the antitrust) analysis employed in Lasercomb and
Practice Management.' In addition, the court acknowledged a novel ap-
plication of the misuse doctrine within the context of licensing
agreements.
Plaintiff Video Pipeline ran a business that compiled movie trailers
onto videotape for display in retail video stores. 95 "To obtain the right to
distribute trailers used in the compilations, Video Pipeline entered into
agreements with various entertainment companies. 96 The subject of this
dispute was a licensing agreement with Disney (presumably the owner of
the named defendant, Buena Vista Home Entertainment) to compile and
use over 500 trailers for Disney movies in Video Pipeline's trailer video-
tape.
9 7
92. For a detailed analysis of the case law in the federal circuits that have not adopted
the copyright misuse doctrine, see Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 23, at 894-901.
93. 342 F.3d 191 (3rd Cir. 2003).
94. See supra Part III.B. 1-2.
95. Video Pipeline, 342 E3d at 195.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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In 1997, Video Pipeline created two websites that make movie trailers
compiled by Video Pipeline throughout the years, including those received
under the Disney license agreement, available for "streaming". 98 However,
the license agreement between Video Pipeline and Disney did not permit
such online use of its trailers.9 After removing the Disney-owned trailers
at Disney's request, Video Pipeline filed suit against Disney, seeking a de-
claratory judgment "that its online use of trailers did not violate federal
copyright law."' °
Upon the filing of the lawsuit, Disney terminated its license agree-
ment with Video Pipeline.0 In response, Video Pipeline copied a few
minutes from each of about sixty-two Disney movies to create its own
trailers for use in its website. °2 Then Video Pipeline amended its com-
plaint to seek a declaratory judgment allowing it to use the trailers it had
created.0 3 The district court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting
Video Pipeline from displaying the trailers on their website, and the
Third Circuit took the case to review the district court's opinion.'0 Video
Pipeline challenged the injunction "on the ground that its internet use of
the [trailers] is protected by the fair use doctrine and ... that [Disney]
may not receive the benefits of copyright protection because they have
engaged in copyright misuse."'""
The court first addressed Video Pipeline's fair use argument in a
lengthy analysis, concluding that Video Pipeline's display of the trailers
was not protected under the fair use doctrine.' °6 The court then turned its
attention to Video Pipeline's contention that Disney engaged in misuse
of copyright. Video Pipeline's complaint centered around licensing
agreements that Disney had entered into with three other companies. 
7
These agreements, which Video Pipeline claimed were copyright misuse
violations because they sought to suppress criticism, provided for the
delivery of trailers to Disney movies over the web, and further stated
that:
98. Id. Streaming is defined as "[p]laying sound or video in real time as it is
downloaded over the Internet as opposed to storing it in a local file first. A plug-in to a web
browser ... decompresses and plays the data as it is transferred to your computer over the
World-Wide Web. Streaming audio or video avoids the delay entailed in downloading an entire
file [before] playing it .... Hyperdictionary, Streaming: Dictionary Entry And Meaning,
available at http://www.hyperdictionary.com/dictionary/streaming (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
99. Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 195.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 196.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 194.
106. Id. at 197-203.
107. See id. at 203.
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The Website in which the Trailers are used may not be deroga-
tory to or critical of the entertainment industry or of [Disney]
(and its officers, directors, agents, employees, affiliates, divi-
sions and subsidiaries) or of any motion picture produced or
distributed by [Disney] ... [or] of the materials from which the
Trailers were taken or of any person involved with the produc-
tion of the Underlying Works. Any breach of this paragraph will
render this license null and void and Licensee will be liable to
all parties concerned for defamation and copyright infringement,
as well as breach of contract ....
Initially, the court recognized and proceeded to adopt many of the
principals set forth in Morton Salt, Practice Management, and Laser-
comb.'09 The court acknowledged the doctrine's foundation in equity, that
the defense does not invalidate the copyright, but rather "precludes its
enforcement during the period of misuse," and reaffirmed the principle
that "[t]o defend on misuse grounds, the alleged infringer need not be
subject to the purported misuse."'' °
The court also recognized the anti-competitive element that fuels
misuse claims, but chose to focus on the "underlying policy rationale for
the misuse doctrine set out in the Constitution's Copyright and Patent
Clause: 'to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.' """ The
court observed that "[a]nti- competitive licensing agreements may con-
flict with the purpose behind a copyright's protection by depriving the
public of the would-be competitor's creativity.""' In justifying a need for
the copyright misuse doctrine, the court noted that both the fair use doc-
trine and the refusal to extend copyright protection to facts and ideas
serve as effective tools to counteract actions by copyright owners that
ultimately conflict with copyright's constitutional goal." 3 The court then
correctly observed that even considering these tools, it is still "possible
that a copyright holder could leverage its copyright to restrain the crea-
tive expression of another without engaging in anti-competitive behavior
or implicating the fair use and idea/expression doctrines."' 1
4
108. Id.
109. See id. at 204.
110. Id. ("[M]isuse doctrine extends from the equitable principle that courts 'may appro-
priately withhold their aid where the plaintiff is using the right asserted contrary to public
interest.'" (quoting Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942))).
111. Id. (citations omitted). The court goes on to state that "[t]he 'ultimate aim' of copy-
right law is 'to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.... Put simply, our
Constitution emphasizes the purpose and value of copyrights and patents. Harm cause by their
misuse undermines their usefulness." Id.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 205.
114. Id.
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As an example of such a case, the court cited Rosemont Enterprises,
Inc. v. Random House, Inc. ," a case which invoked the unclean hands
doctrine and refused to grant an injunction against a potential infringer
because the copyright owners sought to use their copyright to "restrict
the dissemination of information."'16 Conceding that Rosemont Enter-
prises did not concern the subject matter of a typical misuse case, an
anti-competitive licensing agreement, the court focused on the fact that a
copyright holder was denied relief because of his attempt to "disrupt a
copyright's goal to increase the store of creative expression for the pub-
lic good."
'
"
7
In a novel theoretical application of the misuse doctrine, the court
then held that a "copyright holder's attempt to restrict expression that is
critical of it (or of its copyright good, or the industry in which it oper-
ates, etc ... ) may, in context, subvert-as do anti-competitive
restrictions-a copyright's policy goal to encourage the creation and dis-
semination to the public of creative activity.""' 8 Ultimately, however, the
court refused to find Disney guilty of copyright misuse, as the court
could not conclude that the agreements were likely to inhibit creative
expression significantly enough to disrupt the public policy behind copy-
rights." 9 The court cited the available alternatives for Disney criticism
and the lack of evidence that such restrictions in the licensing agreement
would significantly affect the public's access to criticism of Disney.
20
Finally, the court declared that application of the misuse doctrine in this
situation could actually decrease access to the trailers because Disney
might simply refuse to license the trailers at all.
Despite the court's refusal to apply the misuse defense in this case,
its holding that misuse "might operate beyond its traditional anti-
115. 366 F2d 303 (2nd Cir. 1966).
116. Id. at 311. In Rosemont Enterprises, a corporation acting for the publicity-shy
Howard Hughes purchased the copyright to an article about Hughes solely to bring an in-
fringement suit to enjoin the publication of a forthcoming biography on Hughes. Id. at 304.
The concurring opinion noted that:
The spirit of the First Amendment applies to the copyright laws at least to the extent
that the courts should not tolerate any attempted interference with the public's right
to be informed regarding matters of general interest when anyone seeks to use the
copyright statute which was designed to protect interests of quite a different nature.
Id. at 311 (Lumbard, J., concurring).
117. Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 205
(3rd Cir. 2003).
118. Id. at 205-06.
119. Id. at 206.
120. Id. For example, "[t]he licensing agreements do not.. . interfere with the licensee's
opportunity to express such criticism on other websites or elsewhere." Id. The court also noted
that "if a critic wishes to comment on Disney's works, the fair use doctrine may be implicated
regardless of the existence of the licensing agreement." Id.
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competition context," is very significant for several reasons. First, the
Third Circuit has become the fourth federal circuit court to explicitly
adopt the copyright misuse doctrine (the third in eight years), which sig-
nals a growing acceptance of the doctrine that will likely lead to its
adoption in some form by all of the circuits, and inevitably the Supreme
Court. Second, by theoretically extending the misuse doctrine beyond an
anti-competitive context to the suppression of expression, the court fur-
ther distinguished copyright misuse from traditional antitrust analysis
and established precedent to broaden the application of the doctrine, not
only to restrictions on the dissemination of critical language, but perhaps
to restrictions on the dissemination of information in general. It remains
to be seen exactly what kind of influence and precedential effect this
decision will have. In the least, copyright holders who create license
agreements that potentially restrict critical language should at least be
mindful of the possibility that too harsh of a restraint could prove to be
copyright misuse (particularly in the Third Circuit).
B. In Re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation
In 2002, the Northern District of California further analyzed the
copyright misuse doctrine as adopted by the Ninth Circuit in In re Nap-
. 21
ster, Inc. Copyright Litigation.' This memorandum and order on a
motion for summary judgment follows extensive litigation and a ruling
by the Ninth Circuit regarding copyright infringement issues that, while
beyond the scope of this paper, serve as the backdrop for the court's dis-
cussion.1
2
The dispute in this case arose between eighteen record companies
("Plaintiffs") and Napster, "an Internet service that facilitates the
downloading of MP3 music files."'23 Napster entered into a licensing
agreement with plaintiff MusicNet "to distribute the music from the
catalogs of the three participating MusicNet plaintiffs and any other la-
bel that licenses its catalog to MusicNet.' '124 The district court issued this
order and opinion on a motion for summary judgment against Napster
"for willful contributory and vicarious copyright infringement."'' 25 As a
defense, Napster attempted to invoke the copyright misuse doctrine
against the plaintiffs. 26 Napster's argument asserted that:
121. 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
122. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
123. Napster Litigation, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 1092.
124. Id. at 1106. "MusicNet is a joint venture between three of the five record company
plaintiffs... to distribute digital music." Id. at 1105.
125. Id. at 1092.
126. Id. at 1102-13.
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the licensing clauses in [its] agreement with plaintiffs joint ven-
ture, MusicNet, are unduly restrictive. In the alternative, Napster
argue[d] that even if that particular agreement is not unduly re-
strictive, plaintiffs' practices as they enter the market for the
digital distribution of music are so anti-competitive as to give
rise to a misuse defense.
1 27
Napster specifically took contention with the portion of the licensing
agreement that "prevent[ed] Napster from entering into any licensing
agreement with any individual plaintiffs until March 1, 2002.,,128 Addi-
tionally, Napster attacked the portion of the license agreement that
provided that even after March 2002, "if Napster enters into any individ-
ual license with any of the major labels-i.e., the plaintiffs-including
the MusicNet plaintiffs, MusicNet may terminate the agreement with
ninety-day notice."'29 Additionally, the agreement laid out "a pricing
structure under which Napster will be charged higher fees if it fails to
use MusicNet as its exclusive licensor for content."'' 30
The court began its analysis similarly to that set forth in Practice
Management by recognizing the uncertainty associated with the misuse
defense and charting its development from Morton Salt, forward. 3 ' It
also recognized the difference between the antitrust approach, which
requires a finding of an antitrust violation, and the public policy ap-
proach, which prohibits the expansion of copyright to "gain control over
areas outside the scope of the monopoly."'32 After a review of the deci-
sions in Lasercomb and Practice Management, the court concluded that
the current state of the doctrine was largely undefined and difficult to
apply, although the prevailing law indicated that copyright misuse exists
"when plaintiffs commit antitrust violations or enter unduly restrictive
copyright licensing agreements" or perhaps when "the public policy be-
hind the copyright laws" has been violated. 3
The court was also troubled by the fact that the courts adopting the
misuse doctrine have taken pains to differentiate antitrust analysis from
copyright misuse analysis, yet "they still rely on antitrust-like inquiries
127. Id. at 1105.
128. Id. at 1106.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 1103.
132. Id. The court pointed out that the correct test is "whether plaintiff's use of his or her
copyright violates the public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright, not whether the use
is anti-competitive." Id. However, the court also noted that "as a practical matter, this test is
often difficult to apply and inevitably requires courts to rely on antitrust principles or language
to some degree." Id.
133. Id. at 1105.
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in determining what licensing agreements violate public policy." '34 In
support of the contention, the court noted that all the cases utilizing the
copyright misuse doctrine mimic some of the "per se" rules of antitrust,
because the courts find the licensing agreements unduly restrictive on
their face."'35 The court stated that:
[a]s a result, the 'public policy' misuse case law only helps to
identify the egregious cases of misuse-when it is obvious that
the particular licensing provision is overreaching. Currently,
there is no guidance as to how to approach the more sophisti-
cated cases where the text of the licensing provision itself is not
dispositive.13
Unfortunately, the court did not provide an answer to these dilemmas,
instead using the issues to "guide the parties in the evidentiary develop-
ment of the scope of [the] plaintiffs' alleged misuse."13
7
In applying its analysis to the case as hand, the court began by stat-
ing that "[i]t is unclear from the text of the agreement if the exclusivity
provision operates to impermissibly extend [the] plaintiffs' control be-
yond the scope of their copyright monopoly."'' 3 The licensing agreement
in this case differed from the previous licensing agreements in which
copyright misuse was found, as the adverse effects of those agreements
were apparent. 39 In particular, the court struggled with the fact that al-
though the license was non-exclusive, meaning Napster was free to
obtain licenses from any of the record company plaintiffs, it could only
do so by going through MusicNet.' 4
134. Id.
135. Id. "In theory, an absolute per se rule would preclude any defense and restrict the
presentation of evidence to what is needed to characterize the alleged conduct as fitting within
the per se classification." Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 23, at 878. In opposition to the
per se rule in antitrust law is the "rule of reason" approach. "The rule of reason involves a
comprehensive, fact-intensive inquiry where, in the end, courts assess the reasonableness of
contested conduct." Id.; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1162 (7th ed. 1999) (Per Se Rule:
"The judicial principle that a trade practice violates the Sherman Act simply if the practice is a
restraint of trade, regardless of whether it actually harms anyone."; Rule of Reason: "The
judicial doctrine holding that a trade practice violates the Sherman Act only if the practice is
an unreasonable restraint of trade, based on economic factors."). The court in Napster Litiga-
tion goes on to declare that "[n]o court has yet found it necessary to investigate the effects of
[] licensing provisions by adopting an analysis similar to the antitrust rule-of-reason approach
but focusing instead on public policy." Napster Litigation, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 1105.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1106.
139. See id.
140. See id.
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The court eventually determined that the license was non-exclusive
only in theory. 4' In practice, MusicNet has the ultimate control over
which music Napster licenses, because such a license is based entirely
on MusicNet securing a license to that music first. 42 The court observed
that Napster was essentially backed into a corner through use of the
plaintiff's copyrights, because Napster could either sign the overly re-
strictive license agreement to gain access to the catalogs of major record
companies, or refuse to sign the agreement and have "virtually no access
to most commercially available music.' ' 43 Consequently, the court found
these terms to be an "expansion of the powers of the three MusicNet
plaintiffs' copyrights to cover the catalogs of the two non-MusicNet
plaintiffs. ' "
The court avoided ruling on the validity of the agreement due to the
current lack of information about the relationship between the record
companies and MusicNet 45 However, after dispensing with a number of
plaintiff's arguments based on "established" copyright misuse principles,
the court entered into a discussion regarding the crossroads of antitrust
and copyright misuse.
146
The court acknowledged that although antitrust violations could also
qualify as a misuse of copyright, Napster must prove more than a general
antitrust violation. "4 It must "establish a nexus between ... alleged anti-
competitive actions and [plaintiffs'] power over copyrighted material.' 48
Although there was very little evidence in the record relating to the anti-
competitive effects of the plaintiffs' actions, the court ruled that the small
amount of evidence presented by Napster demonstrated a sufficient
nexus to allow for further discovery on the anti-competitive effects and
potential misuse of plaintiffs' copyrights. 149 As such, the court refused to
grant the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, so as to give Napster
more time to obtain discovery to adequately oppose such a motion.'50
The court's holding was based upon the possibility that the plaintiffs en-
gaged in price fixing, an action that "carries antitrust and public policy
141. Id.
142. Id. ("For example, under the MusicNet agreement, Napster no longer has the ability
to obtain an individual license from Sony (a non-MusicNet plaintiff.) Instead, Napster must
rely on Music.Net to obtain a license to Sony's catalog. And, if MusicNet chooses not to obtain
such a license, Napster is effectively prevented from using Sony's catalog.").
143. Id. at 1107.
144. Id. at 1106-07 ("The critical issue is that the agreement binds Napster to obtain
licenses from MusicNet and not its competitors.").
145. See id. at 1107.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1108.
148. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
149. Id. at 1109.
150. Id. at 1109 n.17.
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considerations that may be relevant to misuse."'5 ' The court also utilized
principles previous expounded upon in this paper: that it is irrelevant
whether the alleged infringer is subject to the offending license provi-
sion, and that misuses does not invalidate a copyright, it simply
"precludes its enforcement during the period of misuse."'52
Finally, the court confronted the plaintiffs' argument that Napster's
unclean hands arising from their infringement bars a misuse defense.'53
This assertion was novel, as almost no case law exists that deals with an
unclean hands bar to copyright misuse, and the court was ultimately un-
persuaded by the plaintiffs' argument. In rejecting their argument, the
court relied on the reasoning employed in Alcatel, which held that "[i]f
plaintiffs seek equitable relief .... then 'the defendants improper behav-
ior serves as no bar to its equitable defenses.' If plaintiff 'requests
exclusively legal relief, the defendant's unclean hands may preclude it
from advancing equitable defenses.' "'"" As one reason for this rule's ap-
plication to copyright misuse, the court stated that the misuse doctrine
"is distinguishable from other equitable defenses in that it focuses on
harm to the public as well as harm to the court's integrity."'55
In Re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation is a significant case, but not
because of any dramatic modification of the copyright misuse doctrine.
Indeed, the court did not ultimately even rule on the question of copy-
right misuse, simply denying the plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment in favor of more discovery. However, this case is significant
because the court offers some of the most detailed and specific analysis
of the copyright misuse doctrine to date. The court helped clarify the
difference between antitrust and copyright misuse, and most importantly,
recognized the possibility of a valid copyright misuse defense notwith-
standing a non-exclusive licensing agreement.
Unfortunately, this new application only further complicates the
misuse doctrine's theoretical and practical application. For example, be-
cause the relevant provision need not be unduly restrictive on its face
(due to its non-exclusivity in theory, but exclusivity in practice), what
kind of evidence should the court consider in determining whether the
151. Id. at 1109. The allegations opened up the possibility that the joint venture was
created to allow the plaintiffs "to use their copyrights and extensive market-power to dominate
the market for digital distribution." Id. Indeed, the court noted that "[t]he same conduct by
plaintiffs that Napster alleges gives rise to copyright misuse is currently under investigation by
the Department of Justice." Id.
152. Id. at 1108 (quoting Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516,
520 n.9 (9th Cir. 1995)).
153. See Napster Litigation, 191 F Supp. 2d at 1110.
154. Id. (citing Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 790, 794 (5th Cir.
1999)).
155. Id. at llll.
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copyright owners are engaging in misuse? Since the court tied antitrust
and public policy together in this case, should the court be willing to
employ some form of "rule of reason" analysis similar to antitrust? Or
would such an approach violate precedent since: 1) courts recognizing
the misuse doctrine have done so utilizing a per se (violative on its
face)/public policy analysis; and 2) a rule of reason approach would in-
evitably force courts to consider evidence of anti-competitive effects, an
antitrust approach that previous courts have taken pains to separate from
misuse analysis?
56
As a practical matter, such an invocation of the misuse doctrine
could also complicate and lengthen trials to allow for the collection and
presentation of such evidence. This complication, typical in antitrust
suits, was what copyright misuse doctrine was designed to help avoid.
Moreover, such discovery is likely to yield to the revelation of sensitive
information that many businesses would prefer to keep private. In cases
involving large corporations, these complications could affect their deci-
sions of determining when and if to settle their claims due to such a high
expense of "quasi-antitrust" litigation.
C. The District Courts: A Review of Recent Cases That Recognize the
Copyright Misuse Doctrine But Do Not Unequivocally Adopt It
1. Microsoft Corporation v. Jesse's Computers & Repair5 7
In this case brought by Microsoft against a computer repair shop
(Jesse's) distributing Microsoft Software in violation of copyright law,
the District Court for the Middle District of Florida discussed whether
Microsoft had misused its copyrights. 58 Although the court did not ex-
plicitly adopt the defense, it arguably gave considerable deference to the
doctrine's validity, as the court recognized the doctrine as a potential
defense and even went so far as to analyze the defendant's argument "as-
suming arguendo that the [misuse] doctrine was recognized in the
Eleventh Circuit."
' 59
Ultimately, the court was able to dispose of the defense on several
grounds, including failure to plead the defense with particularity, failure
to prove how Microsoft's conduct is sufficiently related to the case to
invoke the defense, and the failure of the Supreme Court and the Elev-
enth Circuit to explicitly adopt the doctrine of copyright misuse.' 6°
156. See Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1995);
Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
157. 211 F.R.D. 681 (M.D. Fla. 2002).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 685.
160. Id.
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However, the court was careful to note that the only case to address copy-
right misuse in the Eleventh Circuit, Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing
Corp. v. Donnelley Information Publishing, Inc.,6' notwithstanding its
refusal to adopt the doctrine, "acknowledged that the doctrine might some
day be available in copyright cases."' 62 This recognition, combined with
the court's excessive analysis of a doctrine it purports not to adopt, signals
a growing acceptance of the doctrine in Eleventh Circuit courts that could
result in its explicit adoption.
2. Bourne v. The Walt Disney Company
163
In Bourne, the plaintiff, owner of the copyright to a musical compo-
sition, sued for an injunction against Disney to prohibit the release any
media that embodied a recorded performance of the composition. Disney
asserted copyright misuse as a defense based on the fact that that plain-
tiff refused to give permission for a derivative work unless the derivative
author assigned plaintiff all rights to the derivative work. The court re-
jected the defense because the plaintiff did not seek to control areas
outside the grant of the copyright. 64 Although the Southern District of New
York does not contribute a great deal of discussion to the doctrine in
Bourne, it is interesting to note that the court does not dispose of the de-
fense simply by stating that it has not been adopted by Second Circuit or
the Supreme Court. 65 Instead, the court entertained the defendant's mo-
tion on its merits, citing Lasercomb and Napster in its analysis of
whether the plaintiffs sought to control areas outside the grant of a mo-
nopoly.'66 Indeed, the court treated the issue of whether the defendant
should succeed on a copyright misuse defense as critical to the success
of the plaintiffs' copyright infringement action.' 67 However, despite the
court's strong deference to the merits of the copyright misuse doctrine,
the precedential effect of the case might be limited due to the courts fail-
ure to unambiguously adopt the defense of copyright misuse.
161. 933 F.2d 952 (llth Cir. 1991).
162. Jesse's Computers, 211 F.R.D. at 684 n. 16 (citing Bellsouth Adver, 933 F.2d 952).
163. No. 02 Civ. 6400 LTSDFE, 2003 WL 721405 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2003).
164. Id. at * 1, *4.
165. See id. at *4.
166. Id.
167. Id. ("In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that [the defendants] are not likely to
prevail in its assertion of the defense of copyright misuse. Accordingly, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of this action with respect to
their copyright infringement claim.").
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3. Ocean Atlantic Woodland Corporation
v. DRH Cambridge Homes, Inc. 
168
This case involves an order decided by the Northern District of Illi-
nois regarding dispute over a magistrate judge's report and
recommendation ("R & R") to deny a preliminary injunction to plaintiffs
in a copyright infringement suit. 169 In the particular portion of the R & R
that addressed the copyright misuse doctrine, the magistrate judge as-
serted that copyright misuse "cast[s] the gravest doubts on [the
plaintiff's] likelihood of success" on the merits. 70 The plaintiffs alleged
that the magistrate judge manufactured this defense, but the District
Court authoritatively rejected the plaintiffs' contention and proceeded to
adopt the magistrate judge's opinion with regard to the copyright misuse
defense.
171
On its face, it would seem as though this decision explicitly adopts
the copyright misuse doctrine for the Northern District of Illinois. How-
ever, it is unclear what, if any, precedential effect this will have on the
copyright misuse doctrine. First, the court seems to merge the defense
entirely with the equitable defense of unclean hands.' Such a merger
contributes nothing to the precedential value of this opinion with respect
to misuse doctrine, and potentially even detracts from it. Second, since
the magistrate judge's R & R denied relief to the plaintiff on a number of
grounds, there is little, if any, precedential value in the district court's
blanket adoption of that R & R.
4. Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc. 1
73
Here, the Eastern District of Kentucky discusses the copyright mis-
use defense as asserted by a re-manufacturer of replacement cartages
who was sued by the original manufacturer of the cartridges for violating
copyrights in the computer codes embedded in the cartridges. 74 Similar
to the outcome in Bourne, the court, while it could have disposed of the
defense on the ground it has not been explicitly adopted, instead chose to
confront the merits of the copyright misuse defense, and as such, may
have impliedly adopted it.
75
168. No. 02C 2523, 2003 WL 22225594 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2003).
169. See id.
170. Id. at *4.
171. Id.
172. See id. (holding that copyright misuse is "inextricably intertwined with [the] un-
clean hands defense").
173. 253 F. Supp. 2d 943 (E.D. Ky. 2003).
174. Id.
175. See id. at 965-66.
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Although the court does not speak favorably about the odds of suc-
ceeding with a misuse defense, it still lays out the purported test and
rejects the defense on its merits based on the legitimacy of the plaintiffs'
actions.7 6 This decision implies, if not an adoption, at least a growing
acceptance for the copyright misuse doctrine, especially within the con-
text of technology and software.
17
V. ANALYSIS OF THE COPYRIGHT MISUSE
DOCTRINE IN ITS CURRENT FORM
Although there are only a few cases that explore the rules, bounda-
ries, and nuances of the copyright misuse doctrine in depth, including
recent cases discussing it, a few guiding principles have evolved. This
Part will examine these principles in their current state and their effec-
tiveness as part of the copyright and pro-competition jurisprudential
model.
A. The Prevailing Tests for Establishing
the Copyright Misuse Defense
Almost all of the cases dealing with the doctrine seem to agree that
there are at least two approaches to determine the existence of copyright
misuse: (1) the antitrust based approach, and (2) the "scope of the grant"
or public policy approach.
176. Id. at 966. The court stated:
To establish copyright misuse, a defendant must establish either (1) that [the plain-
tiff] violated antitrust laws, or (2) that [the plaintiff] illegally extended its monopoly
beyond the scope of the copyright or violated the public policies underlying the
copyright laws [(citing Microsoft Corp. v. Compusource Distribs., Inc., 115
E Supp.2d 800, 811 (E.D. Mich 2000))]. [Plaintiff] is not seeking to improperly ex-
tend its copyright monopoly. [It] is simply attempting to enforce and protect access
to, its copyrighted computer programs.
Id.
177. In further support of this contention is the number of cases that either acknowledge
or assert copyright misuse at the district court level whose circuit courts have unequivocally
adopted the copyright misuse doctrine. See Costar Group v. Loopnet, 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 708
(D. Md. 2001) ("Misuse of copyright is an affirmative defense to a claim of copyright in-
fringement."); see also Static Control Components v. Dallas Semiconductor Corp., No.
1:02CV1057, 2003 WL 21666582 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (impliedly adopting the same analysis
used in Lexmark); MGM v. Grokster, 269 E Supp. 2d 1213, 1225 (C.D. Cal. 2003) ("Copy-
right misuse is a relatively recent addition to the corpus of judge-made copyright law.");
Blackhawk Indus. v. Bonis, 238 F Supp. 2d 748 (E.D. Va. 2003).
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1. The Antitrust Approach to Copyright Misuse
The antitrust-based analysis mandates that copyright misuse should
be found only when an antitrust violation occurs, or in the very least,
requires that any finding of misuse should be evaluated according to an-
titrust principles. This is the view currently held by the Seventh Circuit
that was taken in Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc."1
8
The approach is to be applied in the same way the patent misuse doctrine
is now utilized, "which applies per se misuse to certain activities (which
are established as such by the Supreme Court) [and a] rule of reason test
... to all other activities." ' 79 As adopted, the rule of reason test contains
two parts. First, if the restraint within the scope of the copyright, then the
activity is per se legal. If not, we must then ask whether the activity on
the whole promotes or restricts competition. ° "The latter part of the test
requires courts to balance the anti- and pro-competitive effects of a par-
ticular activity, e.g., a licensing provision, and determine the net
competitive effect."'
8
'
The rationale behind this approach is that "antitrust laws are in-
tended to prohibit situations that unreasonably harm competition, and
can apply to various uses of intellectual property rights.' 82 Advocates
claim that antitrust and copyright both further the goals of promoting
consumer welfare through free competition and innovation, and that anti-
trust is based on more certain principles than public policy.' This
approach, however, has come under fire by many critics, some of whom
allege that the courts that adopt this view have confused the purposes of
antitrust law and copyright law.'84 Commentators note that the "intellec-
tual property goal of stimulating the creation and distribution of creative
works is different from the antitrust goal of encouraging marketplace
178. 816 F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that "a no-contest clause in a copy-
right licensing agreement is valid unless shown to violate antitrust law"). Although the
Seventh Circuit rejected the misuse defense in its equitable form, it did apply antitrust princi-
ples under a rule of reason analysis to assess the anticompetitive effects of alleged misuse.
Judge Posner promulgated an antitrust approach to evaluating misuse claims because of the
lack of alternatives. This "antitrust-based" misuse resembles modem day patent misuse. Id.
This approach was also adopted by the Eighth Circuit in United Telephone Co. v. Johnson
Publishing, 855 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1988).
179. Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 23, at 898. For examples of activities that are per
se misuse, see Northern Pacific Railway v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (allocation of
markets); United States v. General Electric Co., 358 F.Supp. 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (price fix-
ing).
180. See id.
181. Id.
182. White, supra note 5, at 272.
183. See id.; see also Karjala, supra note 6, at 164 ("[I]t seems more fundamentally
sound to address the ... problem from the perspective of antitrust policy rather than through
application of the doctrine of misuse.").
184. See Scher, supra note 45, at 98.
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competition, and that there are instances in which an antitrust inquiry
alone fails to prevent all abuses of the intellectual property grant that
may harm the public."'85
Ultimately, these arguments overrule the logic associated with em-
ploying a strict antitrust approach to the copyright misuse doctrine,
especially within the context of software and licensing.'86 Because anti-
trust and copyright further different goals, it is very important to look
beyond the anticompetitive effect copyright restrictions have, and to ex-
amine the effect their actions have within the policy of granting rights to
copyright owners. This is not to say, however, that a rule of reason
analysis employing the restriction/action's effect on public policy will
not be effective. Indeed, in a case such as Napster, where the harm to
public policy is not readily apparent, a rule of reason analysis might be
the only acceptable method of evaluation.
2. The "Scope of the Grant" or Public
Policy Approach to Copyright Misuse
The public policy approach, which focuses more on the "equitable
nature of the doctrine as a clean hands defense and on the scope limita-
tion function that it provides," rather than traditional antitrust principals,
was well laid out in Napster.'87 "Under the 'public policy' approach,
copyright misuse exists when plaintiff expands the statutory copyright
monopoly in order to gain control over areas outside the scope of the
monopoly."' 8
The public policy approach was adopted by the Third, Fourth, Fifth,
and Ninth circuits in Video Pipeline, Lasercomb, Alcatel, and Practice
Management, respectively. Although the test focuses on whether the
owner of a copyright uses it to violate the public policy embodied in the
grant of a copyright, such a standard is "often difficult to apply and in-
evitably requires courts to rely on antitrust principals or language
[focusing on anticompetitive use of copyrights] to some degree."'88 Brett
Frischmann and Dan Moylan accurately summarized the public policy
approach:
[any use of a copyright has some anticompetitive effect. The
public policy behind the copyright system is premised upon an
exchange between short-term "monopoly" costs and long-term
185. White, supra note 5, at 276.
186. A "strict" antitrust approach would require an antitrust violation in order to prevail
on a copyright misuse defense.
187. Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 23, at 899.
188. In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, 191 . Supp. 2d 1087, 1103 (N.D. Cal.
2002).
189. Id.
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efficiency gains in investment, production, and dissemination of
innovation. Thus one might conclude that the proper inquiry is
not what the behavior in question violates-public policy or an-
titrust law-but rather whether the social costs arising from
copyright use exceed the expected short-term social costs inher-
ent in the intellectual property grant.' 90
In effect, the public policy approach only confronts the first part of
the antitrust rule of reason approach, as none of the courts who have
adopted the defense have engaged in a true balancing of the pro and con
effects the restriction/action can have on competition.' 9' As such, the
public policy approach resembles the per se test utilized in antitrust law.
The public policy approach is currently the dominant approach util-
ized by those courts that have fully implemented the copyright misuse
doctrine. As a judicially created doctrine that specifically furthers the
goals of copyright law, the public policy approach seem well-suited to
confront the complex issues that arise in the context of software. This
doctrine could be modified to prove more effective if a rule of reason
element was added that considered the effects of the restriction on public
policy for situations like the one presented in Napster With such a modi-
fied approach, the courts could consider evidence beyond the language
of the restriction that would allow them to narrowly tailor their holding
to more equitable balance between the incentive for creation and public
dissemination of works.
B. The Current Strengths and Weaknesses of the
Copyright Misuse Doctrine
1. Strengths
Currently, the copyright misuse doctrine encompasses many attrib-
utes that make it desirable in the resolution of complex copyright
infringement and licensing cases, including those discussed in the previ-
ous section. The doctrine remains desirable over a remedy based in
antitrust violations because of its adaptable form, evidentiary require-
ments, and foundations in equity.
The misuse doctrine is seen by many as a "gap filler", able to resolve
issues that are outside of the reach or clumsily applied by antitrust and
the fair use doctrine.' 92 It can also serve a coordinating function, connect-
ing antitrust, copyright, and patent law, and as a general safeguard to the
190. Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 23, at 901.
191. See id.
192. See Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 23, at 872; see also Dan Burk, Anticircum-
vention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1127 (2003).
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public interest.' Because the misuse doctrine is one of judicial creation,
it is easily adapted to resolve novel conflicts that will appear with in-
creasing regularity due to the rapid advance in technological innovation.
Its ease of adaptation also makes judicial adoption of the doctrine
more desirable than a "hands off' approach in deference to a legislative
body that is slow to react to change, influenced by lobbying interests,
bound by international agreements, and less able to tailor solutions to
individual cases.' 94 One commentator has noted that "Congress has
largely abdicated its constitutional role as drafter of copyright statutes
and acts primarily as middleman, enacting into statutory law whatever
compromises are reached among the various interests groups, that, at
that particular time, have copyright concerns."'95 Further, "copyright has
become so complex that few members of Congress have much interest,
let along understanding, of its basic principles or how it works."' 96 Fi-
nally, legislative resolution of this issue is undesirable because "once
legislation is enacted, retrenchment becomes nearly impossible, because
the same forces that make it difficult to get legislation passed ... now
work in favor of special interests whose [copyrights] are belatedly un-
derstood to be stronger" than what proper public policy balancing
requires. 197
Adoption of the copyright misuse doctrine is also preferable to a
full-blown antitrust counterclaim, given the large amount of litigation
with them that could complicate a simple infringement case dramati-
cally. Such a complication could lead to a large increase in financial
resources needed to defend the case, a luxury many defendants cannot
afford. Without requiring defendants to produce a large volume of evi-
dence related to anticompetitive behavior, the copyright misuse doctrine
serves as a valuable defense. Additionally, "[a]ntitrust analysis cannot
account for the social costs of information fencing, 9" just as it cannot
193. See Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 23, at 872.
194. See Karala, supra note 6, at 178.
195. Id. at 179 ("A fundamental problem with ... legislating is that interest groups that
do not yet realize how or even that they will be affected (perhaps because the technology that
would define their interest has not yet been invented) are unrepresented.").
196. Id.
197. Id. at 182 (Ultimately, "Congress is institutionally incapable of correcting a legisla-
tive error in recognizing intellectual property protection that is too long, too strong, or too
broad").
198. "Information fencing" can best be described as the fencing in ideas and expression
through a variety of technological means such as acquiring copyrights on hidden expression,
exercising black-box copyrights, seeking protection through alternate legal frameworks, seek-
ing protection through extra-legal technologies, and (if the producer has market power)
withholding production thereby raising price. See Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 23, at
918. "Information fencing benefits society by encouraging production of software, though it
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correct internal deficiencies in copyright law or coordinate copyright and
patent law."199
The misuse doctrine remains a more suitable alternative than the fair
use doctrine in many situations as well. First, applying the fair use de-
fense "involves an ad hoc balancing of statutory factors, leaving actors
with lingering uncertainty."2" Second, the fair use defense is significantly
more limited than the misuse defense, as fair use "succeeds only where
the defendant at bar makes some fair use of a copyrighted work ....
[C]ourts evaluating a misuse defense primarily focus on the plaintiff's
conduct: the misuse defense can prevail without further focus on the de-
fendant."201 As such, the two doctrines can work in tandem, as each can
cover areas excluded by the other.
Finally, it should be noted that under the misuse doctrine, copyright
owners are still free to supplement their copyrights with patent protec-
tion and licensing restrictions so long as they do not violate public
policy, federal criminal law, and reasonable technological restrictions.
2. Weaknesses
To be sure, the copyright misuse doctrine is not without fault. The
doctrine still remains only a defense; it has yet to be applied offensively.
There is also some question as to how effective the defense is since the
doctrine only bars enforcement of an owner's copyright during the pe-
riod of misuse, and the owner is free to bring suit once it has purged
itself of the misuse 2
One commentator has criticized the misuse defense because it is too
subjective; the test "'presupposes some transcendent notion of what
constitutes natural or proper patent or copyright [exploitation] and thus
fails to identify any legal rules or standards for fixing the boundaries of
legitimate conduct.' ,,203 This conclusion is arguably erroneous, however,
as the test presupposes only the scope of rights granted with a copyright,
which is precisely the boundary that the critic claims is missing. Other
critics believe that the misuse doctrine gives courts "no solid foundation
for coping with the downside social risks inherent in an unprecedented
meshing of federal intellectual property policies with state-enforced
imposes an important social cost, namely the reduced public access to an author's ideas and
expression." Id.
199. Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 23, at 927.
200. Id. at 922.
201. Id. at 925.
202. See Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F2d 970, 979 n.22 (4th Cir. 1990).
203. Scher, supra note 45, at 106 (quoting Note, Clarifying the Copyright Misuse De-
fense: The Role of Antitrust Standards and First Amendment Values, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1289,
1295 (Apr. 1991)).
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contracts of adhesion." 20 In particular, this critique attacks the defense
based on a lack of doctrinal cohesion and a lack of empirical knowledge
to apply the doctrine reliably to specific fact patterns."' However, these
critics also disavow allowing Congress to specifically tailor a solution as
well, leaving no effective remedy to confront the inequitable actions left
untouched by fair use and antitrust.2 6
Ultimately, the strengths of the copyright misuse doctrine outweigh
its weaknesses in many situations, particularly in the context of software
and licensing. In a period of rapid technological advancement which has
spurred the growth of large businesses with a significant degree of lever-
aging power due to their copyrights, U.S. jurisprudence must include a
mechanism that is easier to employ than antitrust, adaptable to quickly
evolving technological scenarios, more expansive than traditional statu-
tory copyright remedies, but still allows copyright owners to enjoy all of
the rights granted to them. The most likely candidate is the doctrine of
copyright misuse.
VI. CONCLUSION
The copyright misuse doctrine, although yet to be firmly entrenched
in the jurisprudence of many courts, is rapidly gaining acceptance as an
effective mechanism to balance the public policy behind copyrights and
the rights of their owners. Four circuit courts have now officially adopted
the doctrine, and more are likely to follow. Many courts are considering
the doctrine on its merits, contributing further discussion and analysis of
the doctrine, and applying the doctrine in novel situations. These discus-
sions serve to further define the scope of the doctrine with reference to
doctrinal analysis and practical application. As the ambiguities and
vagueness currently associated with the doctrine disappear, it is likely
that the doctrine in its refined form will eventually be adopted in most
jurisdictions.
Currently, the doctrine's strengths outweigh its weaknesses, making
it a suitable doctrine to deal with actions taken by copyright owners who
violate public policy. The doctrine is preferable in many situations to the
potential remedies found in antitrust law, the fair use doctrine, or statu-
tory creation. Indeed, the doctrine functions best as a "gap filler"
204. J.H. Richman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property
Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with the Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U.
PA. L. REV. 875, 919 (1999).
205. See id.
206. See id.
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between these remedies, and is most effective when other remedies are
legally inapplicable or practically undesirable.
Therefore, the doctrine stands not as a fix-all, but as an important
mechanism in protecting society by aiding in the stasis of copyright law
and the software industry-a stasis that is critical to support an increas-
ingly necessary component of the United States' economic and
technological infrastructure.
